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Summary
the author argues that any discourse analysis, as well as other approaches in 
social sciences and humanities, cannot ultimately avoid the truth and ideology 
distinction. the first part of the article provides several glimpses at the Western 
philosophical tradition that preserves the value of truth. In the second part, an 
idea for political science, grounded in such a history of ideas, is sketched. af-
ter a brief discussion of what is ideology as opposed to truth, the author pro-
poses a thesis about ideology, identity and power, and several heuristic ideas 
how to develop it. In the third part, he briefly provides examples from politi-
cal and policy analysis that correspond to such a project. In the final part, he 
explains the importance of preserving the distinction between ideology and 
truth in the discursively postulated “post-truth” era. this combination of epis-
temology, science, analysis and teleology is reflected together in one political 
area of utmost importance for political science operating in the public sphere: 
the politics of naming. 
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ἐγὼ διδαχθεὶς ἐν κακοῖς…
Ὀρέστης
“I have suffered into truth…” (aeschylus 1979, 243).1 thus speaks orestes, 
recounting his experience from which he has learned when to speak and 
when to remain silent. the poetic english translation of the ancient Greek 
verse captures an epistemological tension which is not present in its literal 
rendition (“I have been thought through bad things…”).2 a true insight is 
something associated with experience. the truth is learned through expe-
rience. It is revealed through it. Perhaps more often than not, the access 
to truth on a personal level involves suffering instead of a victorious bliss. 
It comes out of an “ordeal”, a word orestes employs – at least in english 
translation.3
this experience, both ethical (“I am a new subject”) and epistemolog-
ical (“I know something new”), may be timeless in the sense that human 
beings learn about themselves, others and the ways of the world, through 
personal tragedies and collective tribulations. Both philosophers and 
laymen still seek the truth on less ethereal or abysmal levels and express it 
in language: they speak and/or write to communicate it the others, more 
or less versed to asses it. those scholars who are by definition focused on 
less noble levels of truth seeking, thinkers of society, sociologists and polit-
ical scientists, often employ or have employed the words “discourse” and 
“ideology” in conveying their messages about the social and political world. 
the first word usually has something to do with conveying ideology or 
truth (“a discourse is true or infused with an ideology”), while the second is 
opposed to truth (“an ideology per definition is not the truth or the whole 
truth about things: it is a political position”). 
this essay – acknowledging the discourse as a useful concept and its 
valuable usages and analysis – returns to the old couple of ideology and 
truth, as something more fundamental. It tries to clarify both concepts, 
and it tries to show how this distinction still makes sense and can still 
be applied analytically in politics, especially in the present times that are 
sometimes, in various media outlets, dramatically called a “post-truth 
1  verse 276 from The Eumenides (“the Kindly ones”).
2  one version abbreviates this as “Schooled in misery…” (Scott n.d.). a bity funny but 
precise Croatian as well as Serbian translation of the english version which renders the epis-
temological tension might go: “upatio sam u istinu…”
3  In the original it is not a Socratic βάσανος, a touchstone used to check the purity of an 
allegedly precious metal and an enduring metaphor for philosophical, judicial and religious 
ordeals, but simply πράγματα, i.e. things or the real stuff which is as consistent with the line 
of thought I develop in the essay.
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era”. Since I want to go beyond discourse, I have to be careful here. By 
“discourse” I mean a system of linguistic mechanisms that in the social 
sciences and humanities appears as a focus of analysis and an important 
operational concept. even discourse analysis, driven by political or episte-
mological motivation, looks for an ideology in the texts. It says something 
about their political intent. It, so to say, identifies the political software 
behind or coded in the linguistic hardware of the text.4 It is the analysis 
that clarifies what is an ideology that serves power and implicitly what 
truth and possibilities lay behind the words serving power. In other words, 
after six years of academic teaching on the tenure track not to speak of 
many more years of research and assistantship leading to that – teaching 
about Foucault in the field of political ethics and about interpretive policy 
analysis and its tools, dealing with various discourses, stories and construc-
tions in the realm of public policy – I gradually came to the position that 
after all is said and done on the formal level of a discourse analysis, there 
remains one fundamental question. the answer to that question is often 
eluded in a cruel, manipulative or obtuse way. the question is simple.
“Is this true or not?” 
and then perhaps some qualificatory issues emerge such as “on 
which level?” and so on but the quest for the truth remains. to ironically 
paraphrase the introduction, I have suffered into this question from my 
academic experience. this leads me to the purpose of this mental exercise. 
I want to revive an old ethical tradition. the following section will associate 
it with Plato, while the conclusion will associate it with aristotle, viz alas-
dair MacIntyre as one of his prominent modern (“neo-thomist”) followers, 
interested in epistemological crises and the possibilities for political ethics 
in modernity (MacIntyre 1977; 2007; 2016). But I should here point out that 
the tradition is at least a bit older, more widespread and associated with 
civilizations beyond the Western one. For example, it is clearly articulated 
in the teachings of Confucius who was interested in the problem of true 
names present in Cratylus which I discuss below. 
In the 13th book of the analects, Master Kong claims, warning hid disci-
ples that civilized gentlemen should speak carefully: “If names are not 
rectified, then words are not appropriate. If words are not appropriate, 
then deeds are not accomplished. If deeds are not accomplished, then 
the rites and music do not flourish. If the rites and music do not flourish, 
then punishments do not hit the mark” (Confucius 2000, 49). there are 
right names and “aberrations”. From the right names, the right words, 
the right deeds, the right mores and customs, and the just punishments 
follow. I.e. (music aside) a whole structure of authority in a polity, obvi-
4  this is roughly the metaphor van dijk offers in his works, e.g. in his systematic treatise 




ously associated with the distinction between truth and, in modern words, 
ideology. What the analects want to say is that, conversely, if we turn all 
the names upside down and, consequently, live in a lie, a confusion ensues, 
political and moral, and a degradation of a polity. names can conserve 
a tradition to a point and perhaps names can foster a new reality which 
makes them tools of politics. But if things or, obviously much more impor-
tantly, persons, living beings and their environment, history and future, 
are named wrongly, or oppressively, a public space may become a place 
of tyranny. this is the central issue of this essay. the politics of change or 
preservation of an order than becomes a political ethic of the truth.
the structure of the essay revolving around those motivations and 
issues is the following. 
First, I provide several glimpses at the old tradition that affirms the 
notion of truth. the reader can think of it as a series of flashes that reveals 
it in some expected and some less expected places. Is it a big and implicitly 
political ad hominem? do I want to say that these grand old men thought 
so and thus a little one can feel at ease when claiming the similar thing? 
Perhaps. However, beyond their authors being old and venerable, the 
reader will hopefully see that there is some content to it. there is an argu-
mentation beyond mere proclamation.
Second, I turn to the notion of ideology. If something is not truth, but 
not exactly a lie, at least not a simple one, what it is and why? How does it 
work? after a short definitional game, delineating the concept, to explain 
its “why” I will offer a thesis. Here I will borrow from Pierre Bourdieu – 
whose work highlights the language games of power pervading the social 
field, associated with official and unofficial struggle for symbolic capital 
(Bourdieu 2001) but one must also remember Bourdieu was an experienced 
field sociologist who affirmed sociology in a non-relativistic way, i.e. he 
implicitly excluded science from the struggle.5 I will also offer heuristic 
guidelines to apply this thesis with some often misused notions such as 
“identity”, hinting to the “dialectics” of its change, associated with the 
interregnum, a state of the shaken or crumbling political orders in the 
divided societies permeated with ideological and identitarian struggles. 
Let’s say, somewhat pretentiously, that it’s the case of a special theory. the 
essence is quite simple: ideology – conveyed through discourse with its 
5  there is an old paradox at work here, of a guy from Crete claiming that all Cretans 
lie. When we listen to him, he seems to exclude himself from the lot. Bourdieu is a bit 
similar. the struggle of naming is pervasive and political but of course, Bourdieu claims, as 
we should turn to engineers when we build or fix bridges, when we claim something about 
social life we should turn to sociologists who have le savoir sur le monde social. He employs 
yet another analogy claiming it’s a sociologist’s duty to intervene as a meteorologist should 
predict weather. If a meteorologist who can presage an avalanche, in Bourdieu’s metaphor, 
does nothing, he is no good (cf. Bourdieu 2000, 43–44).
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nooks and crannies of language that speaks the truth but also deceives – 
is a function in the struggle for power of various identities. It serves those 
who speak. It has a purpose for them involved in the struggle. Groups, be it 
good or bad, sound or unsound, in the field of political naming claim that 
which fosters their power and expands their liberty or freedom, or what 
they think is a good life for them and others. this may be associated with 
truth beyond or in the realm of appearances but more often is not. (“a good 
economy, socialist or capitalist, may not produce results projected, polit-
ical imposition of duties or system of rights might not lead to good life but 
to the destruction of the social.”) 
third, since I am a political scientist by formation and vocation, I 
provide a few crude examples in politics and public policy just to suggest 
how analysis on this basis could work in practice. these are but short 
elliptic illustrations of what one could do with the thesis and its corol-
laries analytically. that is: after some evocations in the history of ideas and 
a thesis in political science, an illustration of its application or perhaps a 
corroboration in politics and public policy is offered and I intentionally do 
it in a bit “undone” way, throwing ideas and hints how to do it (“the reader 
can apply the theses to explain one or more cases and autonomously reach 
epistemological and normative conclusions”). there is still science, and 
political science is not necessarily political it the narrow sense of a partisan 
bias if it tries to reach the truth and expose ideology.
Fourth and final, this leads me to the question of purpose. In an attempt 
to provide an answer, I bring together the concern for the true names and 
the question of truth in analysis with some familiar republican motives that 
are skeptical to the project of liberalism focused exclusively on the negative 
concept of liberty as a right to say no or extract a particular benefit from 
the state. In the end, I cannot suggest that there is reason for optimism – 
the question of optimism or pessimism of truth preservation is an empir-
ical one – but this teleological framework appealing to practical wisdom 
is decent enough to preserve the truth as a presupposition for any work-
able teleology. It provides for a fair game of a common public vocabulary 
and values against particular interests and the tiresome language games 
of manipulative discourses. It is an ethical call for the value of the truth in 
the so-called post-truth era where the true speech is often replaced with a 
bonfire of ideological manipulation.
a history of truth?  
Some glimpses at the importance of truth  
in the history of ideas
Cratylus, Plato’s famous dialogue about language and naming, is one of the 




where near the very beginnings of Western philosophy as we know it. It 
is of less importance if the particular ancient Greek etymologies offered 
in the dialogue, implying that the names convey some original or essen-
tial truth about things not readily present, are true or a joke: one might 
accept the positions of Cratylus, a naturalist, or Hermogenes, almost a de 
Saussurean conventionalist, or, most probably, on a practical level reach 
a nuanced position between the two extremes as good enough to go on 
with life in language. this is not of central importance here. However, 
there is a place in dialogue where Socrates does not seem to jest, even if 
he speaks hypothetically (which probably, as usual, makes the underlying 
power of logic more convincing). It’s his critique of the sophists, economi-
cally or politically motivated relativist manipulators of the day. If everyone 
has his own truth, it is not possible to divide folly from wisdom. Conse-
quently, wisdom becomes impossible: “and if, on the other hand, wisdom 
and folly are really distinguishable, you will allow, I think, that the asser-
tion of Protagoras can hardly be correct. For if what appears to each man 
is true to him, one man cannot in reality be wiser than another” (Plato 
n.d., 386c).
this partage de la folie, as Foucault had it in his inaugural nietzschean 
Collège de France lecture (pointing to the division between reason and 
madness as one of the procedures governing discourse in the West), here 
serves as the basis of ethics. ethics is grounded in the knowledge of the 
truth. and rightly so. If there is no truth about things on some level, there 
is no basis for ethics and, one might build further in the normative sphere 
of collective life, good politics. We might call “true” those statements 
about things that are not such, or accept madness, but this relativism or 
manipulation might not be the best political course even if it can in excep-
tional cases serve as a gate to the higher truth. n.B. that practical wisdom 
(φρόνησις) in the same dialogue is associated with the right perception 
of motion and flux and temperance (σωφροσύνη) with the preservation 
of wisdom in such circumstances (Plato n.d., 411d-412c), but even these 
and many more etymological insights into the (diano)ethical virtues do 
not carry the point important for us here. as the finishing skeptical bit 
of the dialogue has it, pitting the doctrine of ideas against the Heraclit-
eian flux of things eliminating the possibility of any permanent knowl-
edge (and perhaps language itself as the place of truth): “this may be true, 
Cratylus, but is also very likely to be untrue” (Plato n.d., 440d). It is the 
very possibility of a true discourse that is affirmed prior to this, which is to 
be reached via process of reflection and not by an un-critical assent to the 
externally offered onomata and their accompanying language games and 
practices: “no man of sense will like to put himself or the education of his 
mind in the power of names: neither will he so far trust names or the givers 
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of names as to be confident in any knowledge which condemns himself and 
other existences to an unhealthy state of unreality” (Plato n.d., 440c). 
Perhaps there are no shortcuts in the process of thinking leading to 
the truth, but I hope some shortcuts are allowed in the presentation of 
the history of thought. For the purposes of this essay, we may skip the 
stoical contemplations and theological orientation of philosophy in medi-
eval times. at the dawn of the modern age, renaissance and classicism, 
philosophy may still speak in a theological idiom but its epistemological 
discussions turn secular. there are many interesting contextual problems 
here – whether the metaphysics of the day shapes politics or it’s the other 
way around (Sunajko 2015) – but it’s beyond the scope of this essay. In any 
case, it’s not the higher transcendental truth of God or his immanence in 
the world we are dealing with but the truth of things or ideas. If it’s not of 
things and existence, or of quantity or number, as Hume formulated his 
fork dividing theoretical and empirical knowledge, the discourse should go 
to the flames “for it can contain nothing but sophistry and illusion” (Hume 
1999, 211). We thus formally enter the epistemological modernity and shake 
off the religious and metaphysical excesses from above. 
although one might speak about the critique of idols by Bacon, and 
dig into more pragmatic down-to-earth British tradition of philosophy, 
descartes is an obvious reference if we rewind history a bit from Hume 
and seek an exemplary topos of the epistemological modernity even if 
it’s still clad in the language of God. to simplify a bit, descartes’ thought 
is directed against the swamp of theology and disputatio as a traditional 
jesuit method of arrival to the truth. throwing different opinions on the 
subject is interesting but one is soon fed up and not feeling any smarter. 
the path is needed. a method. descartes’ specific claim of our interest here 
is simple and seems logical as Plato’s “either or” from above. If there are 
two persons with different judgment on the same thing, claims descartes, 
at least one is wrong, as he elaborates within his second rule of method.6 
“at least one” (l’un des deux au moins) is witty and insightful, of course, 
as is the aphoristic procedural continuation from the actually published 
Discourse on method: experienced lawyers (longtemps bons avocats) are 
not, for that reason, better judges (meilleurs juges) (descartes 2000, 104–
105). the argument again slides into ethics – from logics to the good prac-
tice of production of the truth – and it might seem that, contra Hume, 
many philosophers interested in the good life thought that there are ways 
to derive ought from is.
the final example corroborates this position. I have chosen it because 
at the same time it’s contemporary enough and offers an interpretation of 
6  Or, toutes les fois que deux hommes portent sur la même chose un jugement contraire, il 




one of the alleged fountainheads of relativism, nietzsche, specifically his 
essay on truth and lie in an extra-moral sense (nietzsche n.d.). Bernard 
Williams is interested in the concept of truthfulness.7 His final book Truth 
and Truthfulness claims: “the concept of truth itself – that is to say, the 
quite basic role that truth plays in relation to language, meaning, and 
belief – is not culturally various, but always and everywhere the same” 
(Williams 2002, 61). the statement is detonated in the middle of nowhere 
of the book like a bomb, coming from a sort of a once closeted nietzschean 
who offered a Hobbesian interpretation of nietzsche. truth has no history, 
claims Williams. But what does he mean?
First, let’s take care of nietzsche. It’s a harder nut to crack from the posi-
tion of truth. In the said essay, he claims each and every thing is different. 
World is a set of different things. However miniscule these differences are, 
there are no two completely similar things. Language erases such differ-
ences. using that same vehicle, as all nominalists do in their discussions, 
nietzsche claims we forget the differences in the formation of concepts. 
there are no two same snowflakes, even no two same leaves (the latter 
is nietzsche’s example) but we still use the same word to refer to them. 
nietzsche’s poetry enters the story. our nervous stimuli become encoded 
in words. We produce concepts as the spiders spin their webs. We engulf 
the world in metaphors and his picture of truth emerges as a mobile army 
of metaphors and other figures of language through which we refer to the 
world. Columbarium of concepts, graveyard of perceptions are some of the 
figures which emerge in nietzsche’s poetic and aphoristic style. 
So far so good. as Platonic agents in a Heracliteian flux of things, we use 
the words of language as approximation to depict, according to convention, 
this set of human relations we metaphorically represent. truth is a map, 
not the territory itself. We’re fine with it and we might add a tidiness of 
method, following the precepts of the so-called French idealism as formu-
lated by descartes. However, an ethical dilemma then arises for nietzsche, 
the question of will, will to truth as nietzsche calls this in paragraph 344 
of the Gay Science (nietzsche, 1887a). It’s an ethical choice. Science as a 
truth producing activity appears there as a sort of prudence or utility to 
protect ourselves. Why (such) morality? – nietzsche asks further, being a 
philosopher, when nature and history are immoral (he lives in the century 
of Hegel and darwin). Why keep the faith in truth which he equates with 
both Christianity and Plato, and which corresponds to our short history 
7  the concept renders itself more or less easily into French as véracité or in German as 
Wahrhaftigkeit. there are some dilemmas if one wants to translate it to Croatian and Serbian: 
iskrenost corresponds to sincerity, autentičnost to authenticity, and istinitost to the truth-
value of a statement. Perhaps istinoljubivost, equivalent to German Wahrheitsliebe, could go, 
but I leave it to the linguists, being lucky to write this in english. 
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here, affirming truthfulness? (a Humean would perhaps ask: Why derive 
an ought at all?) We after all live in a world of overpowering, dominating, 
reinterpretation, and generally nasty politics. In the world of genealogy, as 
nietzsche’s Genealogy of Morality argues (nietzsche 1887b).
Williams’ answer is simple, albeit all the labels from the history of the 
political theory I will throw at the reader. Hobbesian interpretation of 
nietzsche means that one can affirm both descartes and nietzsche and be 
sort of a Cartesian Machiavelli.8 truth is the correspondence of words and 
things and we may chose it or discard it. If we choose it, we are truthful. 
We choose truthfulness. this has a history. Williams tries to show a norma-
tive logic of this with a thought experiment, with a just-so evolutionary 
story. this is the style of analytic philosophy such as nozick’s. there is a 
state of nature and the statements that are sincere and accurate pay off in 
a social setting if we want to avoid perdition alike to a Hobbesian bellum 
omnium contra omnes scenario. We may save ourselves from a bear attack 
if we shout “bear” when we see one and we may learn from the past when 
we read a truthful history. thucydides is for Williams the father of history, 
since he introduces these values in the activity of writing history: accuracy, 
sincerity and non-mythical time. History becomes rational, emancipated 
from mythical consciousness. Is that bad?
Perhaps, as nietzsche notes in one of his innumerable jottings, there 
are no facts as such but interpretations.9 the old meanings and purposes 
are obliterated as he claims in the Genealogy of Morality. any political 
subject can see that (and that is also one of the reasons why Foucault is an 
unorthodox historian). But there is, together with that statement, a truth 
about changing nature of certain facts. Many facts moreover, especially in 
human affairs. that is the point of genealogy. It is politics, one of a willful 
power or of a reflected choice. nietzsche offers us a true discourse, a poetic 
hypothesis, and his metaphysical self even speculates in a revelation about 
the eternal return since to all these permutations (of facts) there might 
be an end and thus a repetition of the same.10 truth is preserved both in 
nietzsche and his interpreter Williams.
8  I owe the phrases “Cartesian Machiavelli” and “closeted nietzschean” to james Miller. 
He taught about Williams in a seminar Truth, Deception, & Self-Deception in Politics, Philos-
ophy, & the Media at the new School in the Fall semester 2017. as the usual disclaimer goes, 
the acknowledged influence does not imply any responsibility whatsoever for the content or 
the style of the essay.
9  nietzsche frames the statement as a critique of positivism: gerade Tatsachen gibt es nicht, 
nur Interpretationen (nietzsche 1887c). We create hypotheses about the world.
10  this thought is present already in Blanqui’s writings, as Benjamin noticed, “ten years 
before Zarathustra – in a manner scarcely less moving than that of nietzsche, and with an 
extreme hallucinatory power” (Benjamin 2002, 25). Be it said also that the central thought 




the claim seems to be, in this tradition I glimpsed at, however ellip-
tically, that there are truth claims (“Plato”), that multiple contradictory 
“truths” about same things on the same level are not possible (“descartes”), 
that relativism undermines itself and is unethical on some level (“Plato”, 
“descartes”, “Williams”), and very likely politically harmful (I leave a tiny 
bit of aristotle, conveyed through MacIntyre, for the end section). Folly 
may lead to a higher insight, persisting in the falsity may reveal the truth, 
and an unethical conduct may lead to a higher good (as providence works 
in victor Hugo’s novels). there are, in other words, many more thinkers in 
the tradition of Western philosophy, epistemology and political thought: 
Foucault underneath one of his masks, epistemologists and historians of 
science such as Kuhn and Feyerabend, and various political thinkers be it 
adam Smith for economy or Charles Lindblom for politics. they would 
offer a more nuanced picture. My idea in this section is not to offer a 
strict and simplified Popperian morality play (“always strive to falsify, be 
a stern puritan in science and a careful piecemeal engineer in politics”). 
But nuances wouldn’t change the core of the story. the fundamental stakes 
are important: there is truth. every time we speak, we acknowledge it. 
and we should care for it. If we ignore it as such, this may arguably lead 
to discord, peril and decay or at least such are hypotheses offered by the 
prophets and religious teachers above, in their basic form of the empir-
ical truth-claims.
Perhaps there is a big Platonic theme to be elaborated on here, associ-
ated with the claim that there is no justice without the access to the truth. 
the importance of the truth may also work for various ethical and prac-
tical systems such as the one of conquest or mercy beyond the political 
ethics of liberalism of individual rights but such themes would demand 
several volumes beyond these cryptic remarks. I’ll thus content myself 
with a more modest claim. discourse can (and should) convey the truth. 
this is one of its functions. If something, conveyed in a discourse, is not 
truth and also not a simple lie, falsity, poetry or meaningless gibberish, 
and refers to political life, then it’s very probably ideology. and ideologies 
differ. People offer different political stories bringing them into conflict. 
the next sections offers a thesis about how to deal with that. It does so 
from the vantage point of political science which is in reality often closer 
to a partisan advocate than to reasonable judge, even less to a methodical 
scientist, but should ideally aspire to the latter roles. If there is truth, why 
do people speak ideologically and what to do with it? this is not the terrain 
of philosophy but of political science. 
don Quixote where science speaks there would be no weapons without it but the weapons 
respond that without guarding of the peace with weapons there would be no science. It’s both 
a Hobbesian thesis and a Foucauldian insight. 
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Ideology, identity and power:  
an “extension of the domain of struggle” 
What is ideology? 
the interesting narratives tracing the history of the concept from de 
tracy and napoleon via Marx and engels to this day are not important 
here. nor shall I enter into an analysis of the specific ideological posi-
tions as various readers and textbooks do, with a focus on ideologies in 
plural and the “content of political thought” (Heywood 2017, 4). there is 
the usual spatial metaphor of left and right, with a history of more or less 
changing content under those labels; there are anvils and spectra with 
multiple dimensions, and other conceptual tools that present and typify 
ideologies making them easier to grasp (cf. Heywood 2017, 16–17). these 
are also beyond the scope here. all that aside, beneath the discursive fuzz 
and massive literature on the topic, ranging from ideology critique to a 
more relativistic sociology of knowledge, it is a concept that is not that 
hard to grasp even if usual works on the topic often start with about dozen 
of different definitions, which is similar to Geertz’s line-up of the defini-
tions of culture at the beginning of his probably most famous book (Geertz 
1973). I shall give it a try and then typify it along few lines to get some addi-
tional contours.
Let’s take a look at few definitions. For Kent tedin, ideology refers to a 
set of attitudes which means ideology has cognitive, affective and motiva-
tional components (tedin 1987). It may have elements of truth which can, 
in Popperian sense, be falsified, but it is both moral and political: it moves 
the subjects and gives them sense of political right and wrong. ravlić’s defi-
nition accentuates this. For him, ideology is “a set of political ideas and 
values which are made for human orientation and action in an infinitely 
complicated political world” (ravlić 2012, 355–356).11 this set of ideas that 
explains, evaluates and orients an actor, programming his or her action, can 
also be associated with a simple scheme, a tripartite model of “freedom (or 
liberty)” which consists of agent, obstacle and goal: the point is that each 
ideology inscribes them with their own political content (Ball et al. 2017, 
2–3). that means that different practices of naming and ideological signi-
fication in the history of political polarizations call to action (it’s an inter-
pellation, in althusser’s terms) different actors that fit into various more 
or less sound, convincing, comprehensive and coherent stories about goals 
and obstacles between them and freedom or liberty or some other kind of 
politically defined good. For Heywood, who claims that “[a]ll people are 
political thinkers”, the concept refers to the world-views professed by that 
11  … skup političkih ideja i vrijednosti koje su spravljene za ljudsko orijentiranje i djelovanje 




political people, with their visions of good society and some implicit or 
explicit theory of change to reach that preferred end; ideology is, in its rela-
tion to power, a “[m]ore or less coherent set of ideas that provides the basis 
for organized political action, whether this is intended to preserve, modify 
or overthrow the existing system of power” (Heywood 2017, 1, 10).
Several further observations may be added to this framework. It is 
for example not hard to agree with eagleton that ideology is “most effec-
tive when invisible” (eagleton 2007, xvii), since some are blind to what is 
obvious to others, although ideology can and does become visible when 
named as such by others, eagleton included, often in ideological strug-
gles. I obviously agree with eagleton that concept is not to be abandoned 
(eagleton 2007, xxi). eagleton also (beyond being unhappy with Mannhe-
im’s approach as unilluminating), adds some other useful and more or less 
witty remarks such as: “Ideology, like halitosis, is in this sense what the 
other person has”, or “Ideology is a function of the relation of an utterance 
to its social context”; furthermore, when associating ideology with power, 
he rightly claims that all conflicts between persons are not ideological, he 
sees it as a more useful concept than myth, and points out that ideologies 
have “effects within discourses” (cf. eagleton 2007, 2, 5, 8, 9, 109–110, 188, 
194). this is all of course helpful and to it one might add that ideologies of 
endism are themselves ideological (Heywood 2017, 325) and that, if that is 
a parallel with religious figures of thinking (ideological endisms reflecting 
religious eschatologies), it is certainly not the only structural similarity. 
Ideologies can easily be seen as secular versions of religious doctrines with 
their prophets, anointed collective, judgment days, heavens and hells. as 
Bertrand russell long ago noticed in his History of Western Philosophy, 
Marxism has a similar structure to judeo-Christian religious narrative: 
dialectical materialism equals Yahweh, Marx equals messiah etc. (cf. Gray 
2018, 31). But my point is not, at least not here, to explore their tempo-
rality or psychological appeal. More important for the discussion is the fact 
that specific ideologies often fit different contents into the basis-super-
structure theorizing usually associated with some currents of Marxism: 
e.g. class, race, nation, sex, gender serve as the bases of cultural produc-
tion in different (often ideological) ideology critiques. However, as Carl 
Schmitt leaves the basis of political relation empty in terms of identifying 
a specific distinction that can serve as the basis for political contest, we 
must abstract here as well. 
Consequently, various definitions of ideology – in the familiar trope of 
introductory scare-lists, Heywood offers only 9 definitions in comparison 
to eagleton’s 16 – should be discarded or understood as very specific theo-
ries insofar as they point to the specific bases of ideology such as econom-
ical structure of society. as Geertz put aside the various definitions of 
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culture in order to define ethnography as an interpretive science searching 
for meaning, so the theorizing about specific bases of ideology should be 
replaced with a more general theory pointing to power. this means, in the 
end of this short review of literature about ideology, that the most succinct 
definition that I have found is at the same time the best one: ideology is 
meaning in the service of power (thompson 1984).12 the question is then: 
for whom does it work? the question may sound simplistic, archaic, not-
at-all-structuralist but it is still the right question since “structures” in a 
given setting also work for the concrete people which yield power over 
other people however their identities and conceptions might have been 
formed. In the end of this short review of literature about ideology, we can 
thus hear the echo of the above question about the truth:
“Whom does this serve?”
It is not truth but ideology and it works for someone. But how does the 
process usually look? Before finally laying down the thesis that suggests 
where and how to search for the answer to this simple question, I only 
need to link this view of ideology with the motif of politics of naming. 
Ideology produces political names. Bourdieu is a theorist both of power 
and the struggle for names and normative categories. His political soci-
ology is well known and is not to be expounded here. Social fields, forms 
of capital, habitus of an actor in a social field, search for distinction and so 
on: in that dynamic setting, names are not fixed. Bourdieu is right when 
he asserts that battle for names is pretty pervasive in society. His thinking 
is a continuation of the old French tradition of thought that warns about 
politics of naming. In the realm of ideology, Sartre was right: to speak is 
to act, and things which we name have lost their innocence.13 and it is not 
only French tradition, associated with the political Left. Sensibility for 
the politics of language is widespread: “In politics, words and their usage 
are more important than any other weapon”, warns Koselleck, a German 
historian of concepts (Koselleck 1968, 57) who, in his Begriffsgeschichte, 
traced historical changes of language as well as semantics of revolutions 
and crises (cf. Kursar and tomičić 2014).
However, Bourdieu goes a step further which is important here. to reit-
erate, he is quite explicit about pervasiveness of this struggle. We need 
names to work for us. everyone. every civil society activist as every lawyer 
in a court of law and every social human being in a struggle for the defi-
nition of the situation, knows this. this is a process that appears both in 
12  veyne uses the following metaphor that can make such a broad concept more vivid: 
ideology refers to “the relationship between the paper money of words and the gold depos-
itory of power” (veyne 1988, 80).
13  Parler c’est agir : toute chose qu’on nomme n’est déjà plus tout à fait la même, elle a perdu 




public and private settings, it’s formal and informal: there is no social 
agent who does not try to attempt to do this – to create a world that is more 
convenient for him or her by naming (ideologically).14 this is the meaning 
of the above claim that all people are political thinkers even if they do not 
reflect too much. and, to remind the reader, Bourdieu’s position is that at 
least in the social world, words can make things.15 they can change things 
and perhaps even the world. even truth needs power or force to back it up, 
as Bourdieu often claimed,16 which adds another paradoxical layer–not only 
on his sociology, but also on Williams’ philosophy and this text defending 
the truth using both of them.17 
the things in the world are framed as something by ideology: this 
enables some actors and restricts others. to refer to economy, evolutionary 
biology or some other paradigm in search for an explanation why and how 
people produce such names would be very interesting but I feel it’s a task 
for another scientist who would search for specifics. to answer the ques-
tion of who does it and why, and how does this work, I’ll stick with the 
generality of power that is so dear to political science. With the title of the 
section, in any case I want to suggest that this process – ideology produc-
tion associated with identity and power – goes broadly and that ideologi- 
14  Il n’est pas d’agent social qui ne prétende, dans la mesure de pouvoir de nommer et de 
faire le monde en le nommant: ragots, calomnies, médisances, insultes, éloges, accusations, 
critiques, polémiques, louanges, ne sont que la petite monnaie quotidienne des actes solen-
nels et collectifs de nomination, célébrations ou condamnations, qui incombent aux autorités 
universellement reconnues (Bourdieu 2001, 155).
15  Quand il s’agit du monde social, les mots peuvent faire les choses (Bourdieu 2001, 328). 
From Schmitt’s perspective (that political concepts are secularized religious concepts), this 
is but a secular variant of God creating the world with words (Gen 1 & john 1,1 but also 
many other less conspicuous places than the very beginnings such as Ps 33,6). From a reli-
gious perspective, both in Christianity and Islam where adam gives names to the things in 
the world this is an ability taught by God. although there are differences in Christian and 
Muslim tradition (where adem informs the angels or the malaikah about the names) as well 
as between Hobbes’ view on language and Hegel’s Majestätsrecht or the authority to name 
given to the first man, it seems that self-naming (sebe-imenovanje) is a sin in the religious 
tradition in contrast to Hobbes and Hegel (cf. Pavić 2007, 95–96, 102). this also opens norma-
tive questions about the diversity and dissent of names problematized in the creation myths: 
is it a good thing, a projected station in providential eschatology of suffering and salvation, 
contributing to the richness of the world, or a punishment for vanity of falling from God’s 
proto-language bestowed upon adam?
16  He correctly associated this with Spinoza: Je ne cesse de répéter la formule de Spinoza, 
’il n’y a pas de force intrinsèque de l’idée vraie’ (Bourdieu 2000, 68). this, of course, opens the 
big question of interchangeability of true and right in various languages and various etymol-
ogies of the word “truth” which I cannot explore here but I should say that I don’t think the 
results would alter the argument significantly.
17  I should remind of the simple solution for this paradox: “truth is out there”, but truthful-
ness – our attitude – is in the realm of ethics and politics. this also explains the “post-truth” 
era as an ethical and political problem, not an epistemological novelty.
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cal struggle is pervasive.18 So, finally, the thesis (1) and its accompanying 
heuristics (2–6):
1) Ideology is a function in the struggle for power of different collec-
tive identities. there are different bases that can serve to consti-
tute a political collective. the political collectives produce meaning 
based on their current identity. Individuals and groups prefer names 
that better their positions and ensure hegemony. naming is in that 
sense a function of power. If symbolic power is power to constitute 
something, a “quasi-magic”, according to Bourdieu,19 it needs mobi-
lization of force, propaganda or democratic power in the arendtian 
sense. 
2) Identities are composite. economic, social, ethnic, national, sexual 
and so on. Some or all of this makes someone’s complex political 
identity, especially when associated with one’s personal trauma and 
hardship. It is not only economy or a nation or one’s sexuality in a 
concrete case. It is the composition of this and the corresponding 
life experiences that make individuals and then groups different in 
comparison to others which opens the potential for the political 
conflict and serves as the basis for ideological production.20
3) Identities are not fixed. at least in the long run. there is a dialectic 
of particular and universal at work in politics and history. Forma-
tion of identity is associated with collectives, sometimes with partic-
ular and exclusive ones but often with universal projects and their 
legitimation. Languages, wars, revolutions, crises and the bases 
above: they all have a say. People accept political ideas, enter into 
the struggle, win or lose. nothing is fixed, be it good or bad. In the 
realm of natural history, organisms that were, now are extinct. In 
the realm of human history, religions, empires, nations, federations, 
states even more so. they have a shorter time span. not to speak of 
political identities of today.
4) Ideology and eschatology are a function of biopolitics. I want to claim 
that the function of ideology is to promote or stop certain forms of 
18  the reference is to the title of the first Houellebecq’s novel, Extension du domaine de la 
lutte, which could not be translated into english literally, at least by the publisher’s criteria 
applicable to the translation of the titles of the novels of the new and then relatively obscure 
French writers (the novel’s title was translated as: Whatever). the novel has an essayistic 
insert on sexual competition independent of the economic one, with its sexually mostly 
unsuccessful protagonist ending up in nihilism and madness, which is reflected in the writing 
that becomes chaotic.
19  Le pouvoir symbolique comme pouvoir de constituer le donné par l’énonciation, de faire 
croire… pouvoir quasi magique (Bourdieu 2001, 210).
20  Family and upbringing tend to be important. George Lakoff, a cognitive linguist and a 




life. Power is another name for that: forms of life that impose them-
selves on each other or on nature. I shall abstain from discussing 
power in any detail, even if it is a key concept in the long history 
of political science. It has convincingly been done elsewhere, be it 
Hobbes or rousseau, Schmitt, Habermas of Foucault, neumann 
or arendt in political philosophy and theory, Lasswell in his policy 
sciences, Weber, Parsons or Lukes in (political) sociology. every 
political science and public policy primer has to say something on 
it and I have written about elsewhere (Petković 2017, 233–297), and 
there is no reason to repeat that here. Let me only say that, tradi-
tionally and historically, individuals or groups of humans consti-
tuted on various not at all fixed criteria tend to like power and want 
to expand it, even if it’s destructive for them and others (and it 
often is). to impose one’s will against others, wherever this ability 
may stem from, is one of the old and still valid traits of power, as 
Weber had it. It is the analytically delineated “power over” of Marx 
and Weber against the political and social “power to” of rousseau 
and Parsons (of non-problematic collectivities). By referring to 
Foucauldian and later agambenian biopower or sometimes biopol-
itics21 – throwing it like a bomb here, seemingly ex nihilo – I want to 
associate power with human life: collectives renew life or fail to do 
so. eschatology, an old religious and theological term, referring to 
the doctrine about the end of times has its secular variants: ideol-
ogies often speak about their ideal final state. It is often a vision of 
ideal life at the end of history.
5) Intensity of the struggle for names is a measure of the weakness of 
power. decadence of power reflects itself in the chaos of naming. 
When a power struggle is open, a contest for names emerges. If 
political order is unstable, this is marked by the battle of naming. 
It rages up to the constitution of parallel languages in a society. 
a singular symbolic power is shaken. there is no centrality but 
factions. the conflict becomes horizontal. various factions often 
try to employ state apparatus to enforce their names. Penal symbols 
and practices are especially important in this struggle: we do not 
21  Foucault conducts the analyses of liberalism in his lectures the Birth of Biopolitics with 
the help of concepts such as régime de vérité qui partage le vrai et le faux and dispositif de 
savoir-pouvoir, i.e. the very mechanism that is introduced in political economy is the crite-
rion of truth (e.g. the free market). He does not make use of the concept of ideology. He 
rejects it. It’s another language game – a play with words from the perspective taken here. In 
any case, contrary to some simplifications, Foucault does not refuse the concept of ideology 
as such, even in his earlier the archeology of Knowledge and makes use of it in his analysis 
of biopower in the sense employed here, in his earlier lectures Society Must Be defended 
(e.g. racism as ideology).
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only want to fight those who wield the wrong and dangerous names, 
we want to punish them from the position of authority. Struggle for 
the limits of public language that channels itself in private venues 
and interaction of society is part of the struggle for power (revolu-
tionary discourse may, on the contrary, start in private spaces and 
turn public). 
6) Ideology may not be important for life. this may come as an anti-
climax but it is a good way to think about the politics of naming and 
human life. Like in jurassic Park which is, of course, not about dino-
saurs but about american culture and families as well as any given 
Spielberg Movie (except perhaps Schindler’s List): Life finds a way. 
Ideology must serve an emergent force helping power but it may 
also be a symptom of waning power. Life may supersede it. this is 
one of the lessons of the new (natural) history. (alternatively, one 
can think about this “thesis six” not from the perspective of Holly-
wood films but from literature: the endings of Coetzee’s Waiting for 
the Barbarians and disgrace may offer a clue.)
the next step is to show what to do with this set of ideas. Certainly, in 
further analytical work one should draw the precise coordinates of existing 
ideological divides to accompany this position. the existing systems and 
schemata and their application often demonstrate a bias in naming (e.g. 
“liberal” not only today and not without some historical ironies, often 
means an intervention in society and imposition of tax, punishment and 
language, not the freedom from the tyranny of the state). various dimen-
sions are often lumped together, usually of economic issues and the so 
called morality policies, often in an unilluminating and manipulative way. 
But this would mean to enter into specific content which I cannot do here. 
the next section will instead discuss the possibility of application of these 
theses in the analysis on few illustrative examples.
Politics and public policy:  
Some excesses in partisanship and  
ideological vocabularies
Let’s take a look at the first case. It’s a piece of engaged text entitled “Letter 
from a trans man to the old sexual regime” which addresses the readers as 
“Ladies and Gentlemen, and everybody else”. It claims the following: 
Since the sexual and anti-colonial revolution of the past century shook 
their world, the hetero-white-patriarchs have embarked on a counter-
reformation project–now joined by “female” voices wishing to go on being 
“importuned and bothered”. this will be a 1000-year war–the longest of 
all wars, given that it will affect the politics of reproduction and processes 




It will actually be the most important of all wars, because what is at stake is 
neither territory nor city, but the body, pleasure, and life (Preciado 2018).
the author, a new School alumni Paul Preciado, explains that he is 
“not talking here as a man belonging to the ruling class, the class of those 
who are assigned the male gender at birth” and he describes himself in the 
following terms: “I was a Lesbian for most of my life, then trans for the past 
five years. I am as far removed from your aesthetics of heterosexuality as a 
Buddhist monk levitating in Lhassa is from a Carrefour supermarket”.
Beyond the playful juxtaposition of consumerism and Buddhism, three 
things should probably be noted. First, obviously, it is a piece of ideology, 
not a truth statement. Second, by its tone, its echoes engels’ elberfeld 
speeches which call capitalism a brutal war of all against all and call for a 
revolution which will be bloodiest of all wars (and then peace will ensue). 
However, it would probably be completely non-intelligible to engels, not 
because it appears almost 175 years later, but because it places the struggle 
in another domain and seeks a political solution. It shows that sexuality 
and reproduction are ideological by the very fact that some can politi-
cize them as such. third, it thus illustrates the extension of the domain 
of struggle. I have chosen it because it may fit easily into all the six theses 
above if a reader gives it a thought.
If this dimension of the political phenomenon is called politics as a 
struggle for power by the means of ideology in contrast to truth (ideology 
among other means of politics), the two other dimensions, polity and 
policy are as political even if they do not include calls for revolution or war 
as extreme forms of political struggle “continued by other means”. they are 
politics in this perspective – constitutions with their language and values 
are domain of struggle as are strategies, programs, measures, their imple-
mentation and evaluation. Contemporary public policies (as are constitu-
tions and laws) are politics in the sense of irrational maneuvering space, 
opposed to Schimmel, “mildew”, a metonymy Mannheim uses in Ideology 
and utopia to denote other part of the distinction – mere technical admin-
istration and its suffocating bureaucratic documents. this leads me to the 
second set of examples that shows how public policy is ideological.
the perspective on public policies as an area of the political struggle 
for definitions of the problem is classically explored in deborah Stone’s 
Policy Paradox (Stone 2011). It provides both entertaining and meticu-
lous analysis of goals, numbers and stories about causes of problems in 
public policy as an area of ideological contestation. the possible illus-
trations are almost innumerable. there is now a long tradition in public 
policy research that discusses the social construction of target popula-
tions claiming – quelle surprise – that beneficial policies target “powerful, 
positively viewed groups” while “punishment policies” are applied to the 
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“negatively constructed” (Schneider and Ingram 1993, 337). to evoke that 
tradition here is not to criticize its ideological operations and the inser-
tion of ideology where the truth and value judgments can be reached (“to 
say constructed as something is similar to the claim ’discourse is such 
and such’: it puts the truth-question in the brackets”). My interest is in its 
focus on these issues in the situation of a strong “partisan polarization” 
where “mixed, divided social constructions” appear, especially in the case 
of refugees “with some viewing them as courageous people escaping from 
horrendous conditions to make a better life for their families, and others 
viewing them as fraudulent criminals who will sneak into the country and 
commit crimes” (Schneider and Ingram 2018, 16). 
the “moralistic” policy designs appear which “enable the majority party 
to open public debate on moral issues in terms favorable their image, place 
restrictions on the rights of groups aligned with the other side of the issue, 
and promote a social construction of ’shame, unworthiness, immoral’ on 
such groups” Schneider and Ingram 2018, 26). In other words, in public 
policy, we can observe politics – an old process of who gets what, when and 
how, with conflicts which become worse since the battle of names (“the 
propensity to rely on oversimplified stereotypes, labels, and emotional 
appeals is clearly visible”) has intensified leading Schneider and Ingram 
to diagnose a “degenerative democracy” which is “characterized by over-
subscription of benefits to the ’advantaged,’ oversubscription of punish-
ment to ’deviants,’ neglect of the weak, and extensive deception as the 
parties work to make themselves look good (Ibid., 27). to be sure, this does 
not work only for arizona, or some other american state but obviously has 
more general connotations for the policy processes in the West. degener-
ative democracy is another name for a polity of a post-truth era.
to illustrate this further, one can take any contentious policy issue in 
divided societies with possible patterns of degenerative democracy. abor-
tion is usually taken as a crown-example. take for example the operation 
of naming in a narrative offered in MacIntyre’s After Virtue:
Murder is wrong. Murder is the taking of innocent life. an embryo is an 
identifiable individual, differing from a newborn infant only in being at an 
earlier stage on the long road to adult capacities and, if any life is innocent, 
that of an embryo is. If infanticide is murder, as it is, abortion is murder. 
So abortion is not only morally wrong, but ought to be legally prohibited 
(MacIntyre 2007, 7).
It’s easy to contrast this “pro-life” position with a “pro-choice” one: any 
feminist legislation proposal will frame the issue as the question of repro-
ductive rights and medical issue, demand the cost coverage of the proce-
dure from the public health system if there is such, and probably add a bit 
on the voluntary sterilization at public expense. the reader can rest: I will 




the reader to reach. the point of these examples is not to show the obvious 
– that there is at least a little Fouquier-tinville in most of us, the “political 
thinkers” ready to call a nun a criminal assassin (and maybe vice-versa). 
various groups involved in the policy process, as the above letter and virtu-
ally any political commentary on an internet site and various communi-
ques issued by the opposed ideological factions of civil society, could prob-
ably be analyzed with good results with the above 1–6 schema. 
the point is rather normative, to prepare us for the last section. Since 
true statements can be issued clearly on this and other cases given the 
state of knowledge, it should be done so, as should various valuations then 
be given clearly. It is exactly the truth that makes a choice hard and thus 
responsible, not the manipulation of frames that leads to pointless strug-
gles. each reader can do the exercise in the cases and thus see what is at 
stake. In the conclusion I will underline how my motivation is normative, 
not a “positivist” affirmation, as in some straw-man versions, of a frog-eye 
reflection of the easily observable facts that could be associated with “the 
truth”. But the readers will easily notice that, even if I have convinced them 
and they have accepted the old call for truth and perhaps some suggested 
theses for an ideology analysis, they do not have to subscribe to the polit-
ical specifics. 
Conclusion
… a failure perceived most clearly by Nietzsche.
MacIntyre, After Virtue
“of course, you can speak in oratio obliqua, and thus avoid the commit-
ments of speaking straight out.” Searle was right in his Speech acts. We 
can all easily switch to an indirect speech. Instead of “He made a promise”, 
we may say: “He made what they, the people of this anglo-Saxon tribe, call 
a promise”. You can do that “with any word you like” (Searle 2001, 196). 
this is often done with the help of the word “discourse”. In the mean-
while, the questions on the truth and the good remain unanswered, while 
the discourses roam around (there were even quite idiotic suggestions to 
erect a chamber of discourses, published in prestigious political science 
journals). to recapitulate, however, before I get to the ultimate point of 
this critique. 
In this essay, I have first elaborated on some claims from the history of 
ideas that affirm the truth-falsity distinction. there is truth and there are 
good reasons why we use it or why we, as good philosophers, use a noble lie 
knowing exactly it is not true. turning from Plato to the world of aristotle, 
we will want to be ethical and politically reasonable. I thus tried to offer an 
epistemological backing for the distinction between truth and ideology, 
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a statements of correspondence between words and things and the polit-
ical projects of naming. this, secondly, enabled me to associate ideology 
as a partisan meaning with power. Political discourse is often ideological, it 
affirms volatile relations of power. I offered one main thesis and five more 
supporting ones about this: collective identities fight each other with ideol-
ogies, identities are composite, identities are not fixed, end projections are 
biopolitical, battle for names reflect the weakness of power, ideologies may 
misfire. third, this set of propositions can be applied to any given theme 
in politics and public policy in an ongoing Kulturkampf between conserv-
atives and liberals across the globe and to other ideological struggles.
Is this too naïve and after all pretty strange – to implicitly return to the 
transparency of classicism, to the semantic world without any opacity or 
intermediary elements between words and things?22 not exactly, because 
I do not claim that there are not intermediary elements. discourse anal-
ysis is important because language and its uses are not that simple. I only 
claim that there is truth distinct from ideology underneath it all. Fourth, 
this brings me to the last question: Why explain this at all? It’s Bernard 
Williams’ question of the value of truthfulness, more easily answered in a 
context: “Look a bear” makes sense when we are really confronted with a 
bear in the woods. I say the truth (shout “bear” for a bear instead “squirrel” 
etc.) not to be eaten or to save my fellow human beings (from such a noto-
riously ravenous beast). Searle, the guy from the prior paragraph and argu-
ably the biggest living analytic philosopher, has a useful epistemological 
anecdote that will lead us to a similar bottom line: 
Suppose I believe my car keys are on the dining room table. now, how do 
I find out if this belief is true or false? do I hold the belief in my left hand 
and hold reality in my right hand and look to see if they correspond? that 
is not my picture at all. rather, my picture is that I look for my car keys. 
If they are on the table, then my belief is true, otherwise not. In accord 
with disquotation, the way to find that it is true that p, is to find that p. 
the correspondence theory in action is applied disquotation. (Searle in: 
Prado 2006, 113)
either the keys are on the table or not, and that can be checked. the 
purpose of all this (i.e. the history of truthfulness in Williams)? Well, I 
need the keys to drive my car, and I need to drive my car to go from “a” to 
“B”, or more generally to be mobile, move efficiently and so on (add some 
ecological concerns if needed, it does not change the teleological schema 
requiring the truth as a basis). the question in our context is then: why an 
analysis of ideology in contrast to truth in a discourse as a paradigmatic 
task for the social sciences? 
22  C’est qu’entre le signe et son contenu, il n’y a aucun élément intermédiaire, et aucune 




to affirm the true speech against manipulations means to answer to 
the long-going critique of social sciences and liberal democracies which 
have a niche for such an activity (in contrast to, let’s say, theology or state 
propaganda). “Social science positivism fosters not so much nihilism, 
as conformism and philistinism” (Strauss 1959, quoted in: deutsch and 
Murley 1999, 93). Leo Strauss was right. But my effort here, as I have 
suggested, does not fall under the polysemic label “positivism” in the sense 
that I would claim it is value-neutral. this would be the farthest possible 
thing from the truth to suggest. My effort comes out of the pervading 
sense of crisis which sometimes conjures up the term post-truth or even 
the post-truth era. It comes from what I believe, along with MacIntyre 
and many others, is the political crisis of liberalism: “on the dominant 
liberal view, government is to be neutral as between rival conceptions of 
the human good, yet in fact what liberalism promotes is a kind of insti-
tutional order that is inimical to the construction and sustaining of the 
types of communal relationship required for the best kind of human life” 
(MacIntyre 2007, xv).23 I find that statement true, as is the following one: 
“Perhaps above all, liberalism has drawn down on a preliberal inherit-
ance and resources that at once sustained liberalism but which it cannot 
replenish” (deneen 2018, 29–30). In Germany, this is known, at least from 
the mid-1960s, as Böckenförde’s paradox (the Böckenförde-Diktum), i.e. 
the idea that the secular liberal states cannot replenish (or that they even 
destroy) the social capital they presuppose. to be sure, a similar diagnosis 
also comes from quite different political voices. Bourdieu, for example, 
speaks of a waning social state in the West, as a sort of a fine civiliza-
tion (almost as a fine ecosystem inhabited by the big blue catlike humans 
in Cameron’s avatar), only to be destroyed by “neoliberal” barbarians: 
Destruction d’un ordre social qui a été très difficile à construire… (Bourdieu 
2000, 46). the bases of identity are multiple, identities composite, as I 
have claimed, and I will here leave the discussion of the economy of the 
social state aside, but the point is that the feeling of crisis is widespread 
across the ideological spectrum. 
What should one do in the crisis of liberal democracy that produces 
the above intimated scenarios associated even with the terms such as 
“degenerative democracy”? Habermas was perhaps naively optimistic, still 
ready to write hundreds of pages of political theory instead of a Hellen-
istic diary, as for now is this author (writing such a long essay) and prob-
ably most readers of this journal as its very name suggests. Is some form 
of ethical stoicism an alternative? Since the public sphere is contaminated 
by the warring camps and sense of decadence is strong, it may be an indi-
23  For MacIntyre, the neo-aristotelian, “contemporary philosophy theorizing about 
morality is flawed” (MacIntyre 2016, 77), and operates with fictions.
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vidual solution. the pessimism professed by the mentioned French writer 
whose title I used for one of the essay chapters, who sees the entropy of 
the Western society as irreparable, suggests such an approach. For the reli-
gious, some Benedictine model comes handy as ever. to pray and work in 
silence and wait for something old but completely different is a story much 
older than the contemporary bestsellers: “We are waiting not for a Godot, 
but for another – doubtless very different – St. Benedict” (MacIntyre 2007, 
263). However, all the options – a retreat of pessimism or hope, isolated 
stoical endurance or the erection of new small patient communities with 
bits of messianic fatalism, the usual party politics or a revolution – demand 
one thing. they demand true knowledge. those who waged a war or revo-
lution on wrong premises perished as did those who were stoical when 
there was an opportunity of action: to suffer a life of a lost opportunity is 
one of the highest curses in the parables offered by religion – one of the 
bad servant from the Gospel of Matthew who hides the sole talent he has 
instead of using it. However, even outside of such an apocalyptic mood, 
the questions about what is just and good are not answerable without the 
access to truth and understanding of ideology.
after all is said and done, it seems that a meagre call for simple decency 
remains beyond the set of theses which will prove themselves or not against 
political reality. It is the call to be truthful. relativism hides or lies. It post-
pones and manipulates, conducting politics that may not or dare not to 
present itself clearly. Beyond short-term tactical shots this is most certainly 
an imprudent road to political decay. discourse is important, but it’s only 
the first step in an analysis that tries to identify ideology and understand 
it. the battle of naming is going on in the broad realm of biopolitics. the 
truth serves as a basis for justice for different forms of life which is argu-
ably a republican virtue. I am not sure if the telos of this call for truth is 
republican (as opposed to liberal). I have listed several options above that 
are certainly not such, and various historical republican calls have failed 
after all. a republic of true names may seem as a museum, a farce, an irony, 
or it may have a touch of eternity. Plato seemed to think so. However, if 
naming is republican, it would certainly include what Isaiah Berlin, inter-
preting rousseau and others, called a positive liberty, not only a nega-
tive one. It would include duties that recreate life, not only the rights that 
stop power. the above catastrophists of liberalism were right in that claim, 
implicit or explicit. But who knows: who laughs last, laughs the sweetest, 
and the game of truth, ideology and the politics of naming goes on, with 
lives at stake. Here I at least tried to offer a glimpse at an epistemic basis 





a reply to the seven critics
For this sprightly essay I received no less than six engaged anonymous 
reviews, editorial suggestions, and one set of detailed comments from a 
prominent academic colleague and a friend. Some were beautifully written, 
some relentlessly and patiently critical, some were virtually inexhaustible 
and leading to rabbit holes. they were all very valuable, even the one that 
was acridly dismissive. Beyond various minor corrections of clarification 
and major cutting of some three thousand words – the additional literary 
allusions ra(n)ging from Herman Hesse to john Kennedy toole, and the 
whole section about the discourse of truth in religion, usually associated 
with the prophetic anticipations of demise or godly invocations of hell 
– I felt it would be impossible to address all of the constructive critical 
comments by refashioning the essay itself. It would become something 
else, and I did not want that. I liked it just as it was perceived by the most of 
the early readers: interesting and intriguing, with its verbose meandering 
and a repetitive play of interlocked discourses, quite sententious, perhaps 
a bit too rich on the side of imagination – “dazzling but also dizzying”, as 
one of the readers effectively put it. But the critics do merit a response, 
and the only way to preserve the imaginative force of a purportedly unor-
thodox essay, with its less than sound but hopefully mentally stimulating 
parts; its digestibility for the reader and the better academic customs, was 
to briefly as possible address the critical points of the reviewers and the 
readers in a postscript. So here it is – an extra rabbit hole – and, as already 
noted in a note somewhere above, the faults are all mine.
I will first address numerous associations that were thrown at me from 
the rich realm of the history of ideas and more contemporary political 
theory that demand of the author to take a stand on various positions on 
the questions of the subject and the good associated with language and 
truth. I will then switch to the more substantial issues on the nature of 
politics, truth, opinion, and identity that together form the axis around 
which the essay revolves. the interventions will have to brief since longer 
ones would inflate the postscript into yet another essay. unfortunately I 
have to set aside some actual treatises that were brought up: the recent 
one dealing with the relationship of truth and democracy (rosenfeld 2018) 
and a history of truth that tackles “the quest for language that can match 
reality” (Fernández-armesto 2013) – the first one, because it belongs to a 
specific political analysis that adds to a political genealogy of the “post-
truth” era, which is great but beyond the scope here; the second, because it 
is simply too big to handle here. Since I evicted religion, I feel that adding 
some comparative historical anthropology on truth finding techniques 
would be too much. It’s a Foucauldian question of different procedures or 
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alethurgies to arrive at the truth and their mutual relationship. I started 
with a hint of it (truth as ordeal), I have written about it extensively else-
where (Petković 2018), so I can remain silent on it here. Let me just say 
that it seems to me that all the historical and contemporary techniques for 
conjuring up the truth – be it “primordial philosophy” or “great poetry”, as 
Heidegger has it (Heidegger 2002, 47), or good old Popperian science that 
produces falsifiable hypotheses, and so on – have something in common 
in its effect, as do all varieties of lying and forgeries. 
First and foremost, Heidegger and Kant in retrospective of Heidegger 
(as the eleatic forerunners of Kafka, according to Borges, become Kafkian 
in retrospect). I agree that you have to have an identity – you are a subject, 
not a whole, but a part of a moving whole – for the world to be intelligible. 
Be it a Copernican turn, a worn out phrase used to speak of Kant’s critical 
enterprise with man in its center, or a project of philosophy understood 
as an universal phenomenological ontology, i.e. the existential analysis of 
the Dasein (pardon the jargon), this rings true to me. But it is also a truism 
at my level of analysis. Some sketchy hints on the identity forming proc-
esses I add below. 
on the other hand, the absence of Hobbes, beyond a little nod in a 
footnote about religious archetypal parables on naming, is obvious. very 
probably due to civil wars of religious factions, he has the strongest sensi-
bility to the problem of the politics of naming. Let’s put aside the specific 
enmity to the Catholic Church, in the retrospective an overzealous crusade 
against the aristotelian scholastics (he shares this with descartes), and 
intriguing proclaimed sternness towards metaphors: his line of thought 
in the chapter four of the Leviathan parallels the one of the Confucius I 
have offered in the introduction. Hobbes could have been used instead, 
together with some further useful motives appearing in the Leviathan: 
his thoughts on prudence and sapience from the fifth chapter are relevant 
for the last part of my essay, as well as the hermeneutical maxim to focus 
not on “the bare words but the scope of the author” from the Chapter 43. 
His naïve sounding and stalwart constructions (one is almost compelled 
to feel a mysticism in it) starting from the most basic elements are again, 
which is symptomatic, actual in these times. I can only conclude with the 
incomparable charming lines from the fourth chapter of Hobbes’ grand 
oeuvre: “a man that seeketh precise truth, had need to remember what 
every name he uses stands for; and to place it accordingly; or else he will 
find himselfe entangled in words, as a bird in lime-twiggs; the more he 
struggles, the more belimed”.24 Furthermore, if the view that there is one 
semantics instead of many (e.g. one associated with the links between 




words and things, and the other with the rules of public discourse) can be 
associated with Hobbes, I think he is right. (to remind the reader, Hobbes 
is unyielding: when discussing job and the existential stuff of non-polit-
ical suffering, he refuses to use the word punishment for the bad develop-
ments of destiny from the point of view of the subject. He is strict in advo-
cating one universal politics of naming.)
as for Marx, my discussion of ideology is indeed not framed by his 
and engels’ treatise and Marx’s philosophical remarks on alienation. I see 
the talk of false consciousness as an ideological project itself. the world is 
to be changed, according to the 11th thesis on Feuerbach, obviously based 
on some interpretation of it, if not philosophical then perhaps politico-
economical as is the case in Marxism. this position then plunges into a 
revolutionary program which, even if it is not intrinsically malevolent, 
had quite bad historical results in all its geographical and temporal varia-
tions. to say, on the other hand, that ideology is meaning in the service of 
power is to broaden the field of political economy into biopolitics, and to 
include a more complex picture of identity beyond the politically framed 
binary or so economic class struggle. 
aquinas and adorno were also amicably thrown at me in the reviews. 
as for the scholastic definition of truth as the adequacy of thing and mind 
(adaequatio rei et intellectus), it is an understandable association since I 
use MacIntyre but is too big a bite, one that I cannot chew here: it is not a 
modern correspondence theory but much more complex position involving 
a combination of theology and an aristotelian metaphysical paradigm, 
distinction between human and divine intellect, and so on. I cannot do 
any justice to it here. It requires both time for further thought and space 
which I have exhausted. It is something worth contemplating as well as, 
let’s say, eliot’s take on dante’s divine Comedy and the idea of Godly love 
preceding the earthly ones, but as such it seems to be quite out of scope 
here. as for the adornian right to non-identity (one German professor, in 
a parrhesiastic-dyonisiac moment of truth, said this is the most important 
concept for him), I see the negative dialectics as a political claim. adorno 
makes politics out of nietzsche’s remark from above of not two entities 
being really identical. If truth is somehow associated with the develop-
ment of the whole – Das Wahre ist das Ganze, as Hegel puts it in his fore-
word to The Phenomenology of Spirit – this is only a part of the whole, i.e. 
a maxim of ideology for particular identities against the posited whole (in 
adorno’s words: die Unwahrheit von Identität/the “untruth of identity”). 
I’ll reflect on this a bit more in the following part dealing with substantial 
claims. Finally, one of the reviewers was skeptical about liberalism’s value 
neutrality both on theoretical and practical level. He is right in a way and 
that is a part of the problem which invokes analyses ranging from Schmitt’s 
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insights into politics of “depoliticization” to Gray’s critique of what he calls 
“evangelical liberalism”. on the other hand, I cannot really enter how much 
this does justice to the concrete authors mentioned – rawls, dworkin, 
raz and others – since I am not an expert for them. Perhaps it does not. 
However, a critique of liberalism – in the sense of the claim that a sole focus 
on negative liberty, its politics of rights and claims, accompanied with the 
discourses of entitlement and victimhood – forgets a viable program of 
positive liberty to create or preserve something (perhaps associated with 
some forms of social capital), since it constantly and obsessively looks to 
the gutter, stands as far as I can see. to seek a modus vivendi and regulate 
a public reason is to retreat from the problem. It is the situation described 
in the thesis no. 5 above. this finally brings me to the substantial part of 
the response. 
Perhaps most important question raised by the reviewers was: Is the 
whole realm of politics, by its very definition, ideological? there lies the 
crux of the problem with no easy answers in a moving world of collective 
and changing identities, i.e. in political history. one position that can 
be derived from Bourdieu as portrayed above states that words can make 
things in the political realm. this suggests a politics of change or even 
revolution. things can be otherwise. Changing of the vocabulary is part 
of the ushering of the new world. the other position is a conservative one. 
readers may be surprised but it is the one held by authors so different as 
arendt and Foucault, that is, arendt under political attack, writing her 
essay on Truth and Politics, and Foucault discussing the great rage of facts 
(La grande colère des faits) that speak back to political oppression. In 
the essay (originally published in the new Yorker on February 25, 1967), 
arendt memorably claimed that “it may be in the nature of the political 
realm to be at war with truth in all its forms, and hence to the question of 
why a commitment even to factual truth is felt to be an anti-political atti-
tude”. She also stated there that “to look upon politics from the perspec-
tive of truth, as I have done here, means to take one’s stand outside the 
political” and she (“conceptually”) equated the truth with that “what we 
cannot change”. Her point was there are limits to the political will, as was 
Foucault’s in his critique of the use of the political (le politique) instead of 
politics (la politique) in French appropriations of Morgenthau and Schmitt. 
Politics as a technique of governing, normatively understood, is a fine art. 
Both of preservation and change.
In other words, to revolutionaries the realm of politics may seem 
extremely wide, but it is in fact quite narrow. If the names accompanying 
the programs deviate from life, from what works and what is sustainable 
and possible, they will most likely cause trouble – the angry facts returning 




suffering. realm of politics as the realm of the possible is in fact quite 
restrained, at least historically (who knows, with the development of tech-
nology…). Limits to the extreme leaps of ideology and often destruction are 
offered by the truth of life. that’s also the point of the sixth thesis I offered 
above. Words often cannot create an alternate reality. they create an illu-
sion and an oppression instead. Ideology has its limits.25
But how do things change in this worldview? this brings me to the 
words “dialectics” and “identity” I have quite often used above. one of the 
readers was right to mention Kwame antony appiah, whose own complex 
ethnic, cultural and sexual identity made him sensible for the issues of 
identity politics as the new generations in his wider family filled him with 
hope. His view of identities, historical and social scripts, that expand hori-
zons and can play positive role, but are not fixed (he affirms “appropria-
tions”, borrowing and “stealing” from other cultures), seem fine to me. 
the wider points are that identities change in the course of things and 
to be stubborn in fixing them is an ideology as strange as forcing them to 
change. there are subjectivities emerging, mixing, and so on: the “we” and 
“I” change on the basis of personal experience or trauma, history and poli-
tics. I mentioned dialectics to vaguely refer to this process of change. It is a 
much misused word coming from the simple conversations and exchanges 
that evolve dynamically and change those involved. I used the term dialec-
tics in an arguably non-ambitious, very rudimentary and under-theorized 
sense, to denote a gradual shift in the rhythm of political things, i.e. not as 
an overarching logic of history but an observation of change in identities. 
dialectics is not linear, in opposition to eschatology, secular or sacral, and 
it is not static, in opposition to metaphysics (ironically even Stalin remarks 
this in his Questions of Leninism, along with the less sublime lines on 
the destructions of the kulak opposition). dialectics need not to refer to 
a violent political revolution denotes but to an open evolving game. But, 
after all, I don’t want to go much further than to state an empirical obser-
vation that identities and political frameworks do change and a normative 
one that I am not in principle inimical to it.
adornian negations, to be outside or against, appear in this process. 
as one of the reviewers warned, implicitly opening some sociological 
questions about the presuppositions of the “post-truth” politics, opinions 
25  there is a fine moment in Karlo Štajner’s account of his “7000 days in Siberia“, i.e. an 
instructive story of almost 20 years he had spent in Soviet prisons and camps. In the repeti-
tive torturous interrogations he is submitted to, his simple account of truth is called tactics 
by his interrogators. there is it then: a direct juxtaposition of truth and tactics. the point is 
that his oppressors in power feel he is not politically loyal or he might not be. they cannot 
truly prove that he is a spy or counterrevolutionary agent (since he is not), but for them, as a 
social democrat, he is an existential, Schmittian enemy of their ideological cause. the irony 
is that he has survived the ideological regime that has tortured him.
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also appear, “neither true nor false, neither poetic nor meaningless“, thus 
seemingly placing themselves nowhere, or in a heterotopia between truth 
and ideology. there is a useful saying here, uttered by Harry Callahan, a 
police officer from the famous film franchise: “opinions are like assholes, 
everybody has one.” the idea here is not to eschew arguments with vulgar 
remarks or to advocate police brutality, but to point to a problem of indif-
ference and a grain of truth contained in the remark of a fictional tough cop 
armed with a magnum. If opinion is, by definition, not necessarily based 
in fact or knowledge – it is a mere “preference” reframed by Lindblom as 
“volition”, to sound more politically serious – it remains in the purgatory 
of politics. It may be true, or it may be ideology serving particular power. 
We don’t know yet. If it is neither true nor ideology, nor relevant to power 
in any case, well, that’s fine, but it’s no concern of political science. one 
has to make a choice or choice will be made by someone else. 
Is then the political space – as a whole, as such – colonized by the ideo-
logical? and can, for example, something be true outside of power, but 
then become ideological when it comes into power and serves the regime? 
By my definitions no, on both accounts. there might, after all, be a fine 
space for truth in politics, although I admit there are some vertiginous 
possibilities of interpretation here. arendt’s essay is the best proof of it.
Finally, the truth. It indeed seems to be a sort of correspondence against 
constructivism and nominalism. If it’s not such it is not useful except tacti-
cally as a manipulation, i.e. a lie. Correspondence is not enemy of pragma-
tism and does not lead to a scholastic ontology and the intellectual pene-
trations into the somewhat mystical Ding an sich. the whole section of 
the history of philosophy was necessary exactly to find such fine moments 
where the ultimate defense of truth is given. they only point to it because 
truth, of course, cannot be proven by discourse itself. It lies beyond it. It 
resides in things. this is the point of simpler examples of bears and car 
keys but which transpose as well to the examples from identity politics and 
morality policies.26 there are things, and more importantly persons, outside 
26  unfortunately, I also cannot enter the vast jungle of american scholarship on nietzsche 
which was, with considerable furor, thrown at me which does not come as a surprise since 
nietzsche, the restless aphorist and not a serene system builder, is one of the prominent 
mirrors where various authors like to look at themselves and see everything differently than 
it is. as a scholar dealing with Foucault, I am fine with Leiter’s assessments of differences 
between nietzsche and Foucault (Genealogy of Morality is after all something quite different 
than the genealogy of penal policy attempting to explain the Western soul in To Discipline 
and Punish), and Miller’s view of nietzsche’s prophetic utterances as quite different from 
Foucault’s parrhesia, the true speech directed at others not at destiny. as for nietzsche’s prag-
matism, postmodernism and so on concerning truth, I find nehamas’ sober-minded obser-
vation in the recent text convincing. He asks the reader to imagine “foraging in the proverbial 
savannah of the Pleistocene”, i.e. to take the role of one of the “monkeys” in the Clarke’s/




of texts and since our situation is plural and agonistic with different inter-
ests, it is a good idea not to lie or project ideology on things and persons 
but to speak precisely about the same things. translate projected escha-
tological wars as “I want it to be so”, and personal choices as those who 
involve terminations of life if they do. there is a price for choice that is not 
eliminated by incessant melodies of orwellian ideological jargons of poli-
tics, which, following arendt, stumble at something they cannot change. 
We may sometimes need to admit our own selfishness and cruelty. If by 
taking notice of all of this I only engage in enfoncer des portes ouvertes, as 
one of the reviewers noticed, in response I can only quote the old lyrics: 
“the door is locked now but it’s open if you’re true. If you can understand 
me, then I can understand you.”
the only thing left at the very end is a small question of style that 
puzzled at least one of my reviewers: what does a sentence here and there, 
within quotation marks but without a Harvard-style bracketed reference, 
mean? Well, it means: this could be a typical restatement of the claim I 
have just made, its possible coagulation in an indicatory parody of common 
parlance. It is thus not, as it was once said, a strange assault on one’s own 
words, but a slight touch of irony within a narrative that could help a reader 
get a richer understanding of author’s claims.
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Sažetak
Ideologija i istina:  
povratak starog para u doba post-istine
autor tvrdi da svaka analiza diskursa, kao i drugi pristupi u društvenim i huma-
nističkim znanostima, ne mogu u konačnici izbjeći razlikovanje istine i ideo- 
logije. Prvi dio članka daje nekoliko pogleda na zapadnu filozofijsku tradiciju 
koja čuva vrijednost istine. u drugom dijelu, skicirana je ideja političke zna-
nosti, utemeljena na takvoj povijesti ideja. nakon kratke rasprave o tome što 
je ideologija nasuprot istini, autor predlaže tezu o ideologiji, identitetu i moći, 
te nekoliko heurističkih ideja kako je razviti. u trećem dijelu ukratko se navo-
de primjeri iz političke analize i analize javnih politika koji odgovaraju takvom 
projektu. u posljednjem se dijelu objašnjava važnost očuvanja razlike između 
ideologije i istine u diskurzivno postavljenoj eri „post-istine“. ova kombina-
cija epistemologije, znanosti, analize i teleologije ogleda se zajedno u politič-
kom području od najveće važnosti za političku znanost koja djeluje u javnoj 
sferi: politici imenovanja.
Ključne riječi: ideologija, istina, post-istina, diskurs, moć, identitet, politič-
ka znanost, politika imenovanja.
